by Dave Sullivan
During the recent 37th Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur, disagreements among Southeast Asian nations regarding the South China Sea matter were prominently featured in discussions, presentations, and spontaneous remarks, amidst conversations about regional collaboration opportunities and the importance of ASEAN’s role in a context of escalating tensions between major powers.
Raja Dato Nushirwan Zainal Abidin, the director-general of Malaysia’s National Security Council, highlighted that the South China Sea accounts for a mere 4% of the overall relationship between Malaysia and China at most. Malaysia has shifted its focus away from the South China Sea matter and reaffirmed its readiness to engage in discussions with China.
Last April, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim expressed his willingness to address China’s concerns regarding a carbon capture project being developed by Petronas, a Malaysian state-owned energy enterprise, in the Kasawari gas field, a region claimed by both countries.
Despite facing criticism from domestic critics for seemingly supporting China’s claim to the area, Anwar defended his stance by emphasizing his openness to negotiations. Regardless of the validity of these claims, Anwar continues to advocate for dialogue with China and for Beijing to adhere to the guidelines outlined in the ASEAN Code of Conduct.
However, other claimant countries, particularly the Philippines, may not view negotiations as the most effective approach to addressing China’s actions in the South China Sea. Under the leadership of Ferdinand Marcos Jr, Manila has shifted away from its previous closer ties with China during the Duterte administration.
Tensions between Manila and Beijing have escalated in recent months, leading to concerning rhetoric from both sides. Marcos cautioned that any harm to a Filipino citizen due to a deliberate act would be considered nearly an act of war, alluding to recent Chinese activities near the Second Thomas Shoal.
Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro described the South China Sea issue as “existential” for the country, a stark contrast to Malaysia’s approach to the dispute.
The significant disparity between Kuala Lumpur’s and Manila’s strategies, and by extension, Manila’s more assertive stance compared to ASEAN’s policy of non-interference, has profound implications for intra-ASEAN relations and the organization’s relevance.
Manila is actively diversifying its security partnerships and seeking support from regional and global powers that may back its claims, especially when ASEAN appears hesitant to do so.
The Philippines is intensifying defense cooperation with the United States and procuring additional weaponry from the Americans, as the US has reaffirmed its role as a key security ally for Manila following a brief hiatus during the Trump administration.
Simultaneously, Manila is engaging with the European Union, with the European Commission president committing to enhancing maritime security cooperation with the Philippines. Talks of defense agreements with the Netherlands and Norway have further solidified this commitment.
In the region, Defense Secretary Teodoro has been engaged in discussions with his counterparts from South Korea and Singapore at the 21st Shangri-La Dialogue to bolster security ties.
Manila’s actions underscore its willingness to seek concrete support elsewhere if ASEAN, particularly under Malaysia’s leadership in 2025, does not endorse its position.
These divisions within ASEAN are not transient and are not limited to current leaders. As nationalism in the region grows over South China Sea disputes and major powers like the US and China vie for allies in their escalating competition, disparities among ASEAN member states on how to handle the conflicts are likely to widen.
These discrepancies could ultimately lead to ASEAN being unable to take decisive action, leaving the region scrambling to establish new security arrangements.