by Jake Sanders, Editor
The United States and its allies in Europe and Asia have collaborated to address the challenges posed by China by combining resources and enhancing communication on shared concerns. This cooperation typically centers around bilateral and small-group arrangements.
In 2023, the United Kingdom and Japan finalized a Reciprocal Access Agreement, which outlines procedures for the UK military and Japanese Self-Defense Forces to conduct joint exercises and training in each other’s countries. Japan is also seeking a similar agreement with France.
Germany and France have dispatched their naval and air forces to the Indo-Pacific region, both to demonstrate resolve towards China and due to European nations’ interest in upholding freedom of navigation. In 2023, Berlin deployed its first warship to the South China Sea in nearly twenty years.
Simultaneously, the United States is formalizing trilateral naval exercises with Japan and South Korea, as well as with Japan and the Philippines, to enhance coordination among their respective military forces.
NATO has been a prominent player in these discussions. While Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea have longstanding relationships with NATO, these connections were previously viewed as more symbolic than substantive and were not established with a specific adversarial country in mind.
The situation has now changed. NATO is now explicitly mentioning China in its summit declarations. In 2019, the alliance acknowledged that “China’s expanding influence and global policies present both opportunities and challenges that we must address collectively as an alliance.”
NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept takes a firmer stance, highlighting China’s aggressive rhetoric, “malicious hybrid and cyber operations,” and use of economic leverage over smaller nations.
There is now a growing belief that NATO, originally formed during the early Cold War to protect Western Europe from the Soviet Union, should be re-oriented to counter China, or at least contribute to that effort. Some, like former Supreme Allied Commander Europe James Stavridis, have even proposed including Japan, South Korea, and Australia in the alliance.
While it is true that NATO’s rivals and adversaries are increasingly aligning with each other, this alone is not a sufficient reason to shift NATO’s focus away from its traditional area of operation. Although NATO has undertaken missions beyond Europe, such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, it remains a crucial player in ensuring security and stability in the region.
The act of turning NATO into a security provider in the Indo-Pacific region or formalizing its ties with IP4 nations would present internal challenges within the alliance and exacerbate the security issues that NATO and its Asian allies aim to tackle.
To start with, the divisions within NATO are apparent. Currently, there is no unanimous agreement on broadening NATO’s scope to encompass Asia, especially with the specific objective of containing Chinese influence. NATO member states have varying reasons for being hesitant about this move.
French President Emmanuel Macron’s opposition primarily stems from concerns that integrating Asian security affairs into NATO’s official agenda would dilute the alliance’s traditional emphasis on deterring threats in Europe.
France, particularly under Macron’s leadership, is reluctant to sour its relationship with China or take actions that might escalate the chances of a direct military conflict with China, regardless of how unlikely it may appear. These concerns prompted Macron to veto the establishment of a NATO liaison office in Tokyo last year.
On the other hand, for Germany, the issue is less about advancing security in the Indo-Pacific region itself and more about safeguarding Berlin’s €250 billion ($274 billion) trade ties with China, which has been Germany’s largest trading partner for the past eight years.
Hungary is deepening its ties with China, making it likely that any efforts to expand the alliance’s activities beyond its usual scope will face resistance from Budapest due to its own interests.
Furthermore, except for the United States and possibly the United Kingdom, it is uncertain whether NATO members have the military strength, resources, and capability needed to significantly enhance deterrence in Asia. The defense industry in Europe is already under strain, primarily focused on preparing for a potential conflict on the continent that is not expected to end in the near future.
Germany’s contribution would likely be limited to occasional freedom-of-navigation exercises in critical points in the region, but sustaining such symbolic actions could be challenging given Berlin’s extensive defense budget cuts over the past thirty years.
While France has commitments in the Pacific region, its territories are situated far from the First Island Chain and may not be particularly valuable in a wartime scenario.
Lastly, as NATO shifts its focus more towards Asia – China, Russia, and North Korea are expected to counter that in order to maintain a favorable balance of power in the region.