What weight does France have in the Indo-Pacific?

by Benjamin Blandin, geopolitical analyst, Kuala Lumpur

The French Indo-Pacific strategy is often misunderstood and sometimes misunderstood. In this immense and crucial region, France is frequently perceived as a former colonial power that is expected to play, at best, a secondary role.

It is true that France had a long colonial presence in the region, for about three centuries, from 1674 to 1954, notably in Madagascar, Djibouti, Mayotte, India, Indochina and the South Pacific. In addition, it has also resorted immoderately to gunboat policy against Siam, Vietnam, China and Korea. Today, because of this history, it finds itself in conflict with Mauritius for the island of Tromelin, with the Comoros for Mayotte and the Glorious Islands, and with Madagascar for the Scattered Islands. In the Pacific Ocean, France is also facing an independence movement in New Caledonia and its possession of Clipperton has been openly questioned by Mexico.

In addition to historical issues, several more recent events have also contributed to this perception: the nuclear tests carried out by France until 1995, the scandals related to defence contracts signed with Taiwan, as well as with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the 1990s and early 2000s, and closer to home, Canberra’s cancellation of the submarine contract in favour of the AUKUS agreement and the abandonment by Australia of defence contracts with France (Tiger attack helicopters, NH90 transport helicopters).

In addition, the French regional security apparatus has been considerably reduced, from 8,500 to 7,000 men over the past ten years. Not to mention the post-subprime crisis budget cuts (the dreaded LOLF and RGPP) in French diplomacy which have led to a reduction in staff in a number of embassies. All these factors have clearly had an impact on France’s image in the region and have contributed to a contrasting opinion among the public, as well as experts and political and military authorities.

In addition, France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, published in 2019, remains unclear to many of our neighbours, partners and allies. France would certainly benefit from improving its communication around its initiatives and concrete results, to make them better known and appreciated. Better cooperation would also be necessary between its (too) many agencies, which are regularly in competition with each other.

A singular country among European nations in the Indo-Pacific

France is certainly not the most powerful country operating in the Indo-Pacific region, but it is neither a small nor a distant power in the region, where its presence has been continuously maintained since the first half of the sixteenth century.

It is also important to note that even though France was a colonial power, it established its influence through a variety of means, including the exchange of diplomatic envoys and the establishment of alliances with local rulers, direct involvement in various conflicts, the presence of Jesuit scholars at the court of the Qianlong Emperor in China, the construction of Vauban-style fortresses in Siam and Vietnam, and the creation of a modern naval arsenal in Yokosuka, in Japan. A large number of French people from all professions have also contributed their knowledge and skills to local leaders.

Even today, France’s presence in the area is a major singularity since it is the only EU country to be a member of the UN Security Council and to be a resident power in both the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, on a set of territories that represents 25,810 square kilometers for a population of nearly 2 million French people. and 93% of the French exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the second largest in the world, just after that of the United States. Its main companies have a strong presence there, particularly in the defence sector, where France ranks third among suppliers, with fruitful ongoing cooperation with India, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia (perhaps soon in the Philippines) and older successes in Australia and Taiwan.

In terms of influence and diplomacy, Paris enjoys a unique position with a very dense and diversified set of soft power and cooperation tools. This includes, first, its network of embassies and consulates, one of the largest in the world; secondly, the French schools and cultural centres (Alliance Française network) located in all the major cities; thirdly, its chambers of commerce and industry linking French and local companies; fourthly, French international cooperation institutions such as the French Development Agency (AFD) and Expertise France; fifthly, a network of 18 military attachés in addition to liaison officers in the regional information fusion centres in Madagascar, New Delhi and Singapore, coordinating defence and maritime cooperation and conducting military diplomacy. This unique diplomatic tool, envied by many European countries, allows France to be an active member of the most important forums and mechanisms of regional cooperation.

Limited resources but an innovative approach

However, observers often believe that France “lacks muscle” in the Indo-Pacific.

Such an assertion is not unfounded. It is true that the number of troops in the area has been reduced by 20% over the last 10 years and that the naval presence has decreased sharply since the 1990s, but in any case France has neither the ambition nor the means to be a major military power in the Indo-Pacific. Its partners and allies in the region do not expect or demand that it take sides in the US-China rivalry or intervene between them. Building on its historical heritage of strategic autonomy and political independence, France wants to open up a third way, neither pro-US nor anti-China, which resonates with the strategic posture of non-alignment of ASEAN’s “Perspectives on the Indo-Pacific”. As such, Paris favours a position of facilitator, good neighbourliness and trusted partner that promotes the rule of law and demonstrates its commitment to regional security and freedom of the seas.

The French defence architecture in the area includes two sub-regional commands – ALINDIEN for the Indian Ocean and ALPACI for the Pacific Ocean, in addition to the sovereignty forces positioned in Reunion Island, French Polynesia and New Caledonia – and follows an S-shaped axis. This axis connects the metropolitan core to its overseas territories through a network of allies and strategic partners including the United Arab Emirates, India, Singapore, Indonesia and Australia (but also Vietnam, South Korea and Japan). With some of them, France has established an innovative strategic defence dialogue, such as the trilateral strategic dialogues “France-UAE-India” and “France-India-Australia”.

This axis also includes five military bases located in Abu Dhabi, Djibouti, Reunion Island, Noumea and Papeete. In these bases, 7,000 soldiers and various equipment are permanently positioned to protect France’s interests. It is also worth noting that since the publication of its Indo-Pacific strategy, France has significantly strengthened its presence in the region. This includes regular deployments of major naval assets such as its Naval Air Battle Group, nuclear attack submarines, and helicopter carriers. Paris has also carried out “air raids”, deploying Rafale fighter jets, A330 MRTTs and A400Ms each year from France, Djibouti and the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier to India, Southeast Asia, Australia and New Caledonia – and this, in record time, allowing us to demonstrate the capabilities of our latest equipment and to train with our allies.

In light of an ever-strengthening American security architecture and a generally absent European presence, it took time for France’s singular positioning to gain visibility and be fully understood. Some countries in the region have even wondered whether France is not, by nature, part of a “global West” and therefore a de facto partner in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), but the loss of the submarine deal with Australia to AUKUS has greatly contributed to repositioning France “on the radar” of many countries, especially ASEAN. French companies now occupy the position of third largest arms exporter in the region.

A stabilizing power?

On the diplomatic level, France has been able to establish peaceful relations with its former colonies. It reached an agreement with Mexico on Clipperton in 2007 and signed a framework agreement on Tromelin Island with Mauritius in 2010. It has also strengthened its presence in ASEAN and is more present at the Shangri-La Dialogue. Other options have been considered to strengthen its status, such as the extension of its bases, the positioning of a permanent fleet and a Rafale squadron, or a Europeanisation of its security architecture (even if it represents 90% of the EU’s presence), but all are economically or politically sensitive and Paris seems for the moment to favour a modernisation of its existing assets.

In a more practical way, France leverages its extensive maritime expertise to deepen its ties with all interested parties, through the concept of “State action at sea”, the design and construction of complex naval systems, the creation and preservation of marine protected areas, the conduct of search and rescue operations at sea, combating marine pollution, combating maritime crime and illegal activities, and maritime law enforcement.

France is also one of the countries most involved in the fight against climate change. In particular, it has made a significant contribution to the recent international treaty improving the protection of the high seas. The size of the French EEZ, the knowledge provided by its overseas territories around the world, and the diversity of its maritime domain place France at the forefront of countries that can act as a framework nation in various and increasingly crucial areas for the region: protection of global commons; resilience to climate change; protection of the environment and biodiversity; preservation of cultural heritage; humanitarian aid and disaster response; blue economy; maritime security, ocean governance and the protection of marine resources; and enhanced connectivity.

As we can see, France has no shortage of assets or initiatives and has truly transformed its policy and strategy in the region in recent years. Many projects have been launched and encouraging results have been observed. It now remains to better exploit the fruits of this unique approach.

(Originally published in French -The Conversation / La Tribune, April 2024)